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Abstract
I examine whether individuals respond to monetary incentives to detect latent medical
conditions. The effect is identified by an amendment to Title 38 that deemed diabetes associated
with Agent Orange exposure a compensable disability under the VA’s Disability Compensation
program. Since a diagnosis is a requisite for benefit eligibility, and nearly one-third of diabetics
remain undiagnosed, the advent of disability insurance may have encouraged the detection of
diabetes among the previously undiagnosed population. Evidence from the National Health
Interview Survey suggests that the policy increased the prevalence of diabetes by 2.7 percentage
points among veterans.
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I. Introduction
The early detection and treatment of certain medical conditions and diseases substantially
reduces the risk of morbidity and mortality. For example, Bunker, Frazier, and Mosteller (1994)
conclude that screening for and treatment of hypertension (i.e. high blood pressure) increases life
expectancy by five to six months; and periodic testing for cervical cancer increases life
expectancy by 10 to 15 years. Based on current medical evidence, medical screening is now an
integral component of public health policy. In a report to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services titled Guide to Preventative Services, the U.S. Preventative Services Task Force (2002)
recommends proactive screening for nine medical conditions and diseases.1

These

recommendations are based in part on whether the benefits of detection and subsequent treatment
outweigh the potential complications of screening.
Despite the potential health benefits of early detection, the direct and indirect costs of
medical screening may discourage many individuals from seeking medical consultation and
consequently knowing their health status. Indeed, health policies designed to increase medical
screening rates generally involve reducing the direct costs borne by the individual. But even
when the cost of medical consultation is negligible, many health diseases and conditions remain
undiagnosed. For example, despite the near zero costs of determining one's HIV status - testing is
potentially free, timely, and anonymous - Glynn and Rhodes (2005) report that in 2003
approximately 24%-27% of individuals infected with HIV are undiagnosed. If the detection and

1

The U.S. Preventative Services Task Force recommends - with caveats - screening for breast

cancer, chlamydial infection, colorectal cancer, osteoporosis, lipid disorders, diabetes, obesity,
and cervical cancer.
1

treatment of latent medical conditions is a prescribed policy goal, then understanding the motives
for detecting latent conditions has important policy implications.
In this study, I consider whether individuals respond to monetary incentives to determine
their diabetes status by exploiting a policy change to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Disability Compensation (DC) program. The DC program compensates veterans for disabilities
either acquired or aggravated during military service. Many Vietnam veterans causally
associated their diabetes with Agent Orange exposure, an herbicide used extensively during the
Vietnam War. However, veterans seeking compensation for diabetes faced two difficulties when
establishing service-connectedness. First, there was little to no medical evidence that dioxin
exposure is associated with the onset or aggravation of diabetes. And second, applicants would
have to provide documentation that they were exposed to Agent Orange during military service.
Therefore, many veterans seeking DC benefits for diabetes were presumably denied.
This changed in 2001 when the Department of Veterans Affairs deemed diabetes mellitus
a presumptively service-connected disability. This amendment to US Code Title 38 (AT38),
eliminated the two difficulties to establish service-connectedness. First, the National Academy
of Sciences, commissioned by the VA, concluded there was limited or suggestive evidence of an
association between exposure to dioxin, a chemical contained in Agent Orange, and the onset of
diabetes. This opened up the possibility that diabetes was indeed service-connected. And
second, the VA would presume exposure to dioxin based on dates and location of service, so
Vietnam veterans would not have to prove direct exposure to dioxin. Because of the extensive
use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, presumably all diabetic Vietnam veterans became eligible for
DC benefits after the policy was implemented.

2

The change to DC eligibility criteria had a measurable impact on DC rolls and
expenditures. Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2008) conclude that approximately 7 percent
of Vietnam veterans alive in 2006 were either newly eligible for or enjoyed an increase in DC
benefits, increasing DC expenditures by an estimated $2.85 billion in fiscal year 2007 and total
expenditures in net present value by $50 billion. The effect of the policy on DC rolls was so
evident that by the end of fiscal year 2005, 20.8% of the .916 million Vietnam beneficiaries were
receiving compensation for diabetes, compared to (at most) 6.2% of the .750 million Vietnam
Era beneficiaries just four years earlier.2
Because a diabetes diagnosis is a requisite for DC benefit eligibility, the change to the
DC program’s medical eligibility criteria may encourage the detection of diabetes among the
previously undiagnosed population. This is a plausible behavioral response since nearly onethird of adult diabetics in the US remained undiagnosed (CDC, 2003). If disability insurance
positively impacts the incidence of diabetes diagnosis, then the prevalence of diagnosed diabetes
should rise in tandem with the increase in DC rolls and expenditures due to the policy change. If
disability insurance has no detection effects, there should be no differential increase in diabetes
prevalence among those affected by the policy.

2

There were 46,395 total compensated diabetes cases on the rolls at the end of fiscal year 2001;

and 190,199 compensated cases among Vietnam Era beneficiaries at the end of fiscal year 2005.
There were 749,554 and 916,220 Vietnam Era beneficiaries receiving disability compensation at
the end of fiscal years 2001 and 2005, respectively (VBA Reports). The figures cited are
calculated assuming that all cases in 2001 were among Vietnam Era veterans, a conservative
assumption, and that each beneficiary can have at most one diabetes case.
3

Numerous studies examine the effect of disability insurance on labor supply (Autor and
Duggan, 2003; Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton, 2008; Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002;
Bound, 1989; Borsch-Supan, 2000; Chen and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Gruber, 2000; Parsons,
1980), yet few studies examine detection effects of disability insurance. Empirically identifying
detection effects is complicated since benefit eligibility rules are generally applied universally,
so it is difficult to disentangle detection effects due to disability benefits from other health trends.
In this study, the policy only affected Vietnam veterans, so an attempt is made to disentangle the
effects of disability benefits from other plausible factors.
But even in cases in which an adequate comparison group is available, the advent of
disability insurance may change de facto medical standards for diagnosis. Kubik (1999)
examines legislative changes to Supplemental Security Income and concludes that SSI benefits
encouraged the detection and treatment of mental health conditions among children. And Cullen
(2003) finds that an increase in supplemental revenue to schools to accommodate students with
disabilities increases the percent of students defined as disabled. However, in both cases, it is
difficult to determine whether the rise in prevalence is a result of increased detection or vague
medical standards. In this study, I examine the effect of disability insurance on the diagnosis and
treatment of diabetes, which are arguably less subjective than many other measures of health
status.
The analysis also contributes to the discussion of the causal pathways responsible for the
socioeconomic status and health gradient; in particular, differential values of life. The value of
life hypothesis states that patient individuals value future returns relative to immediate returns
more so than less patient individuals; so patient individuals may invest more in human capital,
including both education and health (Grossman, 1972). Time preferences, however, are difficult

4

to quantify for empirical analysis. In this study, I surmount this difficulty by examining a policy
that effectively shifted the returns of health investment from the future (i.e. marginal declines in
mortality and morbidity later) to the present (i.e. disability benefits effective immediately).
To estimate the impact of AT38 on the prevalence of diabetes among the veteran
population, I use data from the National Health Interview Survey. Survey years 1997 through
2006 are chosen to adequately span before and after AT38 was implemented, which occurred in
2001. Only males born between 1944 and 1950 are considered in the analysis sample since a
significant proportion of Vietnam veterans are male and born during these years.
Using nonveterans as a comparison group, the results indicate that the prevalence of
diabetes increased by 2.7 percentage points among veterans after AT38 was implemented
relative average changes in diabetes prevalence over the same time period. However, only half
of veterans in the NHIS sample actually served in the Vietnam theater, so AT38 may have
increased diabetes prevalence by as much as 5.4 percentage points among those affected by the
policy. It is unlikely that differential exposure to Agent Orange is driving the empirical result
because, according to a publication by the Institute of Medicine, the increased risk of diabetes
onset from herbicide exposure is small. Auxiliary analysis suggests that a significant proportion
of the rise in diabetes is due to new diagnoses and that the likelihood of diabetes treatment also
increased after the policy was implemented.
A straightforward calculation suggests that total increase in DC benefit expenditures due
to AT38 is substantially greater than the estimated value of increased life expectancy among
newly diagnosed diabetics. However, at the individual level, the value of increased life
expectancy exceeds the net present value of DC benefits. Therefore, to be an effective policy

5

instrument, monetary incentives to encourage the detection of latent medical conditions should
be targeted to those who are least likely to be diagnosed.

II. VA Disability Compensation
A. Program Rules
DC benefits are awarded to veterans with disabilities deemed to be service-connected,
defined as a disease or injury either aggravated or acquired during active military service (which
includes wartime and peacetime service).3 At the initial application level, applications are vetted
through a three-member Rating Board, composed of one medical doctor and two nonmedical
personnel. The Board evaluates the disability and its service-relatedness by verifying the timing
and etiology of the medical condition and the applicant’s service record. An applicant may
appeal the initial decision to the Board of Veterans Appeals; subsequent appeals are then made to
the Court of Veterans Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Disabilities and their severity are identified by the use of the VA's Schedule for Rating
Disabilities. The Schedule defines and quantifies each disability using a disability percentage
scale ranging from 0% (generally a non-compensable rate) to 100% (totally disabled) by
increments of 10%. If a veteran exhibits multiple service-connected disabilities, a combined
ratings table is used to aggregate the severity ratings, and the final level of disability is rounded
to the nearest multiple of 10%. The disability compensation benefit is determined by this
combined degree of disability.

3

As a compensation program, disability benefits are not offset by earned or unearned income.
6

To determine the benefit amount, the VA considers the average reduction in earnings
capacity associated with a combined degree of disability.4 The benefit amount increases
nonlinearly with the combined degree of disability. In 2001, monthly payments to a single
veteran with no dependents whose combined disability rating was 10%, 50%, and 100%, were
$103, $625, and $2,163, respectively.5
Compensation for multiple and/or partial disabilities is a defining feature of the VA
disability compensation program - SSDI and SSI do not provide benefits for partial disabilities and is quite common among disability compensation beneficiaries.6 The impact of an additional
disability on the combined disability rating is based on residual capacity, so the loss in earnings
resulting from each additional disability are not considered additive. For example, if a veteran
has two separate disabilities both rated at 50%, only 50% of his or her ability is subject to the
second 50% disability. The overall disability would therefore be 75%, which is subsequently
4

“The Secretary shall adopt and apply a schedule of ratings of reductions in earning capacity

resulting from specific injuries or combination of injuries… based, as far as
practicable, upon the average impairments of earning capacity resulting from such injuries in
civil occupations (USC Title 38, Part II, Chapter 11, Subchapter VI, Section 1155).”
5

At the end of fiscal year 2005, there were 7.68 million compensated disabilities and 2.64

million DC beneficiaries, averaging 2.9 disabilities per beneficiary. Dependency benefits are
payable to beneficiaries who have a combined disability rating that is at least 30%.
6

While SSDI does not explicitly compensate for partial disabilities, an SSDI applicant can

satisfy the severity requirement of the general disability standard maintained by SSA -'inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity' – with either a single impairment or a combination
of impairments.
7

rounded to 80%. In this manner, the combined ratings table precludes a beneficiary from
receiving a combined disability rating greater than 100%.

B. Amending Title 38
Exposure to Agent Orange, an herbicide used extensively during the Vietnam War, is
associated with the onset of certain medical conditions. From 1965 to 1971, approximately 18
million gallons of Agent Orange were sprayed in all four military zones of Vietnam, intended to
destroy foliage that would otherwise serve as cover for opposing forces. Soon after the War
ended, Vietnam Era veterans became increasingly concerned about the long term health effects
that exposure to dioxin, a compound contained in Agent Orange, may have. In 1978, the VA
established the Agent Orange Registry to monitor the long-term health consequences of Agent
Orange; however, no conclusive evidence existed at that time which linked Agent Orange
exposure to the onset of any determinable medical condition. Therefore, most veterans who
sought DC benefits for conditions believed to have resulted from Agent Orange exposure were
presumably denied.
Diabetes was perhaps the most common medical condition anecdotally associated with
dioxin exposure. However, in 1994, a scientific review committee comprised of Institute of
Medicine (IOM, 1994) researchers concluded that there was inadequate or insufficient evidence
of an association between dioxin exposure and the onset of diabetes.7 This decision was reversed
by the IOM in 1999, based on new research conducted by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (Calvert et. al.,1999) and the U.S. Air Force (AFHS, 2000), concluding that

7

Subsequent IOM reports, Update 1996 and Update 1998, upheld this initial position.
8

there was limited or suggestive evidence of an association between dioxin exposure and diabetes.
Its conclusion, which reversed the conclusion of three preceding committee publications, was
published in a report, "Veterans and Agent Orange: Herbicide/Dioxin Exposure and Type 2
Diabetes," released in October, 2000 (IOM, 2000).
One month after this publication's release, the Acting Secretary announced that diabetes
associated with Agent Orange exposure would be deemed a presumptively service-connected
disability for Vietnam Era veterans (DVA, 2000), though the policy did not go into effect until
July, 2001.8 This opened the possibility that diabetes was indeed service related. Additionally,
presumption meant that Vietnam Era veterans did not have to prove direct exposure to Agent
Orange; instead, the VA would presume exposure based on period and location of service.
Because of the extensive use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, presumably all diabetic Vietnam
veterans became eligible for compensation for diabetes.9
Compensation by the DC program for diabetes could be substantial. Because the change
in benefits due to diabetes is determined by residual functional capacity, the impact of AT38 on a
beneficiary's disability payment depends on his or her initial disability ratings (unrounded
combined disability rating). Table 1 illustrates the initial benefit amount and the change in
benefits resulting from an appended diabetes case, illustrating the varied, and considerable,
incentives for Vietnam Era veterans to seek compensation for diabetes after AT38's
8

Currently, eleven diseases are presumptively service-connected due to Agent Orange exposure,

including Hodgkin's disease, chronic lymphocytic leukemia, prostate cancer, and respiratory
cancers.
9

Certain Vietnam Era veterans who served in the Korean War would also become eligible for

DC benefits; but their exposure and consequent service-connectedness would not be presumed.
9

implementation. A veteran whose diabetes was rated at 10% (requiring a restricted diet only)
and was not previously receiving disability compensation benefits (an initial rating of 0%) would
receive $1,236 in benefits annually after AT38. The change in benefits could be as large as
$25,956 annually, resulting from a 0% initial disability rating and a 100% diabetes rating.
The increased generosity of DC benefits had a measurable impact on DC enrollment and
expenditures. According to Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2008), 7 percent of Vietnam
veterans either became newly eligible for or received an increase in DC benefits; new DC
enrollees account for two-thirds of the increased enrollment. The increase in DC rolls and
expenditures - and the abundance of VA sponsored pamphlets and websites to disseminate
information regarding Agent Orange and DC benefits – suggest that veterans were well informed
of the policy change. Because a diagnosis is a requisite for DC benefit eligibility, the rise in DC
enrollment for diabetes may be partially accounted for by the detection of diabetes among the
previously undiagnosed population. If monetary incentives do increase the incidence of diabetes
detection, then the prevalence of diabetes should rise in tandem with the growth in disability
rolls. This is examined in the next section.
III. Data
A. Data Specifications
The empirical objective is to estimate detection effects of disability insurance, identified
by the advent of DC benefits for diabetes. The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS),
conducted annually by the National Center for Health Statistics, is well suited for this study. The
NHIS is a standard data source for tracking trends in health behavior and illness in the US, noninstitutionalized population, including diabetes prevalence. In contrast to the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System, another commonly used health survey, the NHIS is conducted
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nationally and is considerably more standard across both US states and time. Additionally, the
sample sizes of the NHIS surveys are quite large relative to the National Health and Nutrition
and Examination Survey, another common source for health statistics.
I use annual NHIS data from 1997 through 2006 and restrict them to the population of
interest. The years were chosen to adequately span before and after the implementation of
AT38, which occurred in July, 2001. Only males are included in the analysis sample since most
veterans are indeed male. Furthermore, I drop observations that had missing or unreported
values for variables pertinent to the study; education, marital status, military history, health
insurance status, and self-reported diabetes.
A limitation of the NHIS, as well as the other health surveys, is that respondents are only
asked whether they are veterans; era or location of service is not ascertained. Because the
presumption clause of AT38 only applied to Vietnam veterans who served in or around Vietnam,
it is difficult to precisely identify veterans affected by AT38 in these data. To identify those
most likely to have been affected by the policy, I examine the Veteran Supplements of the
Current Population Survey, available biannually, which contain information on period of service
as well as location. To increase the sample size of male veterans, I pool Veteran Supplements
from years 1997, 1999, and 2001.
In Figure 1, I plot separately the percentages of veterans, Vietnam Era veterans, and
Vietnam veterans who served in or around conflict areas by year of birth.10 The graph illustrates
a downward trend in the proportion of veterans from older to younger birth cohorts, but there is a
10

The Veterans Supplement does not contain year of birth; it is approximated by subtracting age

reported in the survey from the survey year. Vietnam veteran refers to veterans who served on
the ground in, in the water surrounding, or in the air above Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.
11

noticeable spike in the proportion of veterans between birth years 1944 and 1950. The increased
demand for manpower during the Vietnam War explains nearly the entire spike, indicated by
Vietnam Era veteran line. However, not all Vietnam Era veterans actually served in Vietnam.
According to the Vietnam veteran line, approximately half of these Vietnam Era veterans served
in or around Vietnam. Thus, in the NHIS, I focus on veteran and non veteran males born
between 1944 and 1950, keeping in mind that AT38 applied to only half of these veterans.
B. Data Summary
Table 2 contains standard demographic information from the NHIS by veteran status
among males born between 1944 and 1950. By construction, veterans and non veterans are
similar in age. Rates of marriage, which may provide protective health effects, are also similar
across these two groups. One notable difference is that veterans are almost entirely black or
white, compared to 8 percent of non veterans belonging to a different racial group. There is also
a disparity in education. More specifically, the distribution of educational attainment among
nonveterans has more dense tails compared to veterans: 17.9% of nonveterans have less than a
high school education and 35.6% have a college degree or more, compared to 6.5% and 27.7%,
respectively, among veterans.
Veterans and non veterans also differ by insurance rates: 7.4 percent of veterans report no
health insurance, compared to 12.2 percent of non veterans. This disparity is not due to
differences in rates of insurance through an employer, which is reported by 80 percent of both
veterans and non veterans. Health insurance through the VA partially covers the gap in
insurance coverage; 12.7 percent of veterans report health insurance through the VA, though 4.1
percent report health insurance report both VA health insurance and employer-provided
insurance.

12

C. Diabetes Prevalence and Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Keeping the differences in demographic characteristics across veterans and non veterans
in mind, I construct preliminary evidence of the impact of AT38 on diabetes prevalence by
plotting the prevalence of diabetes by veteran status and year (Figure 2, estimates and standard
errors are given in the Appendix Table 1). To reduce sampling noise, estimates are calculated
within two-year increments. If AT38 increases the detection of diabetes, the trend of diabetes
prevalence among veterans should shift discretely in 2001 (if the response was precipitous);
change in slope after 2001 (if the response were gradual); or both.
According to the graph, the series of prevalence estimates before AT38 appear similar in
level and slope between the two groups, but the prevalence increases discretely among veterans
shortly after AT38 was implemented, whereas much of the change among non veterans can be
explained by the pre-existing trend. From 1997/1998 to 2001/2002, the prevalence of diabetes
increased by 3.4 percent points among veterans compared to an increase of 4.6 percentage points
among nonveterans. However, from 2001/2002 to 2005/2006, the prevalence of diabetes
increased by 6.5 percentage points among veterans compared to just 2.0 percentage points
among nonveterans. Using the standard difference-in-differences estimator from 2001/2002 to
2005/2006, AT38 increased the prevalence of self-reported diabetes by 4.6 percentage points
(standard error: 1.8) among veterans. However, this estimate does not take into account that only
50 percent of veterans are Vietnam veterans and are therefore affected by AT38. Assuming the
rise in diabetes is similar among non veterans and veterans who did not serve in or around
Vietnam over this time period, the prevalence of diabetes increased by approximately 9.2
percentage points among veterans affected by the policy.

13

In addition to year of birth, I consider other instruments in the Veteran Supplement to
further identify veterans who served in or around Vietnam. However, to be a reasonable and
feasible instrument, the policy should have no impact on the instrument, and the variable must be
available in both the Veteran Supplement and the NHIS. Conditional on veteran status,
educational attainment is the only reasonable and observable characteristic correlated with
Vietnam veteran status. According to the Veteran Supplement, 43.2 percent of male veterans
born between 1944 and 1950 served in or around Vietnam, compared to 52.6 percent of male
veterans without a college degree. Therefore, if less educated, veteran males are more likely to
have served in Vietnam, then the rise in diabetes should be greater relative to their more
educated, veteran counterparts.
To determine if this is indeed the case, I plot diabetes prevalence of veteran by
educational attainment between 1997 and 2006 in Figure 3. Although the prevalence trends are
noisier among veterans due to smaller samples, the figure suggests that much of the rise in
diabetes among veterans is driven by the less educated.
Ostensibly, the aggregate trends suggest AT38 increased the prevalence of diabetes
among veterans, and the increase is concentrated among those more likely to have served in
Vietnam. But the results remain inconclusive. The most pressing concern is that males born in
1944 through 1950 are between the ages of 46 and 62 during the analysis period; ages at which
diabetes prevalence is on the rise. Therefore, if there are unobservable factors that generate a
heightened prevalence of diagnosed diabetes at these ages – due to different rates of diabetes
onset or detection or both - that are correlated with veteran status or their socioeconomic
characteristics, then it would be misleading to attribute the entire rise in diabetes among veterans
to AT38.

14

The first concern is whether unobservable factors unique to veterans affect the prevalence
of diabetes, through differential rates of diabetes onset or detection. To explore this possibility, I
estimate veteran-specific profiles of diabetes prevalence by age using NHIS data. To avoid pretest bias, I only use data before AT38 was implemented: 1997 through 2001. The age profiles
are plotted in Figure 4. As indicated, the diabetes-by-age trajectories are nearly identical
between veterans and non veterans, suggesting that the differential rise among veterans in Figure
1 is not due to factors unique to veterans.
Second, there may be factors unique to Vietnam veterans that affect diabetes onset. The
most obvious factor is dioxin exposure: if dioxin is indeed a causal factor for diabetes onset, then
veterans may exhibit a differential rise in diabetes diagnosis as they age. However, this
alternative mechanism seems unlikely based on a statement in a follow-up report by the National
Academy of Sciences: “The increased risk, if any, posed by herbicide or TCDD exposure
appears to be small… the known predicators of diabetes risk – family history, physical inactivity,
and obesity – continue to greatly outweigh any suggested increased risk posed by wartime
exposure to herbicides (IOM, 2002).” Thus, differential exposure to Agent Orange should not
drive the empirical results.
Third, there may be differential rates of diabetes detection between Vietnam veterans
and non Vietnam veterans. To be sure, all Vietnam veterans are eligible for free diabetes
screenings through the Agent Orange Registry, whereas 12 percent of non veterans are
uninsured. Although the ease of diabetes detection for Vietnam veterans may affect to degree to
which they responded to AT38, and therefore the generality of the empirical findings, it is
difficult to reconcile the precipitous increase in diabetes prevalence without considering AT38 as
a causal factor. Additionally, the number of examinations conducted through Agent Orange
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Registry examinations increased shortly after AT38 was implemented as well. In 1999 and
2000, just before AT38 was implemented, 5377 and 7957 examinations were conducted;
compared to 23406, 23548, and 30836 examinations in 2001, 2002, and 2003 (Agent Orange
Review, 2004). The discrete increase in examinations provides suggestive evidence for the
proposed mechanism; the policy increased the incidence of diagnosis among the previously
undiagnosed population.
And finally, veterans and non veterans vary across observable demographic dimensions.
If socioeconomic status is associated with differential rates of diabetes onset and detection, then
the differential rise among veterans may not be a result of AT38. In the next section, I control
for differences in socioeconomic characteristics by estimating the difference-in-differences
estimator in a regression framework.
IV. Regression Framework
A. Empirical Specification
The aggregate trends suggest that the rate of self-reported diabetes increased among the
Vietnam veteran population in response to AT38. However, veterans and nonveterans
systematically differ along observable characteristics. If the incidence of diabetes differs along
these dimensions, the change in diabetes diagnoses may be spurious.
A regression framework addresses this issue by estimating the impact of AT38 on
diabetes among the veteran population while simultaneously controlling for observable
characteristics. The preferred, linear probability specification is given by:
1|.
where

∑

,

1|. is the conditional probability that individual in time reports having been

diagnosed with diabetes. The variable

is an indicator of veteran status, equaling one if the
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respondent is a veteran and zero otherwise. The variable

is an indicator for post-AT38

reform; it equals zero for years 1997 through 2001 and one thereafter.11 Variation in the
interaction of these two variables identifies , the differential change in the prevalence of
diagnosed diabetes among veterans. Period fixed effects, which are coded in two-year
increments, control for average changes in diabetes prevalence over time; and the veteran fixedeffect captures time-invariant differences between veterans and non veterans.

is a vector of

individual characteristics; race (black only and other race relative to white only), education (high
school, some college, and college and beyond relative to no high school degree), and individual
age fixed effects.
The coefficient on the interaction term

represents the discrete change in diabetes

prevalence after AT38 was implemented. To causally associate

with the advent of DC benefits

for diabetes, it must be assumed that veterans and non veterans would have exhibited similar
changes in diabetes prevalence over time in the absence of AT38, quantified by the period fixed
effects. Since veterans systematically differ along socioeconomic and demographic dimensions,
which may interact with age over time, this identification assumption may not be valid. To
plausibly control for the effects of socioeconomic and demographic on diabetes prevalence over
time, I include full interaction terms of race and educational attainment with age.
B. Baseline Results
The baseline estimates from the NHIS sample of males are presented in Table 3.
Initially, I exclude the vector of individual characteristics and estimate the model of diabetes
diagnosis with the veteran, post-AT38 interaction term and veteran, age, and period fixed effects.
11

Though the policy was implemented in July, 2001, the post variable first equals one in 2002,

the first full year in which the policy was applicable.
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The estimate of , presented in column A.1 of Table 3, implies that AT38 increased the
prevalence of diabetes by 2.9 percentage points among veterans shortly after the policy was
implemented. Only half of veterans actually served in or around Vietnam, so AT38 increased
the prevalence of diabetes among Vietnam veterans by 5.8 percentage points.
Also in column A.1, veterans are 1.6 percentage points less likely to be diagnosed with
diabetes relative to non veterans. This difference in diabetes prevalence is partially attributable
to observable differences in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. When race and
education fixed effects are included, presented in column A.2, the difference in diagnostic rates
between veterans and nonveterans falls from a statistically significant 1.6 percent to an
insignificant 1.3 percent. As indicated, minorities and the less educated, factors partially
correlated with veteran status, are significantly more likely to be diagnosed. However, the
inclusion of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics has no impact on the estimated
effect of AT38.
In the final column of panel A, I include full interaction terms between race and
educational attainment with age, allowing for differential age trajectories along socioeconomic
and demographic dimensions among veterans and non veterans alike. The estimated effect of
AT38 declines to 2.7 percent, but remains statistically significant at the five percent level of
confidence. The coefficients on the education fixed-effects, which are interpreted as relative
differences in diabetes prevalence at age 46, reverse sign. One interpretation is that the
prevalence of diabetes – both diagnosed and undiagnosed – is greater among the less educated,
but diabetes is detected earlier among the more educated.
Because Vietnam veterans are less likely to have a college degree, I estimate the same
specifications excluding those with college degrees. The estimates are presented in panel B of
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Table 3. Across all specifications, the estimated effect of AT38 on the prevalence of diagnosed
diabetes is greater than those in panel A. According to column B.3, diabetes increased by 4.2
percentage points among veterans relative to non veterans. Given the standard assumptions, this
implies that diabetes increased by 8.4 percent among less educated Vietnam veterans.
Furthermore, when full interactions of race and education with age are included, the coefficients
on race reverse sign. As with the education in panel A, the results may reflect that minorities are
more likely to be diagnosed with diabetes on average, but diabetes is detected earlier among
whites.
C. Mechanism and Other Margins of Response
The increase in DC enrollment and expenditures and the simultaneous rise in diabetes
prevalence among veterans suggest that monetary incentives encourage the detection of latent
medical conditions. Factors associated with veteran status do not appear to driving the empirical
findings, and the discrete increase in Agent Orange Registry examinations supports the
contention that the rise in diabetes diagnosis results from the detection of previously
undiagnosed diabetes.
To provide further evidence for the suggested mechanism, I estimate the probability of
diagnosed diabetes within the past five years of the survey year using the same sample and
empirical specifications above. A five year lag was chosen because the last year of the NHIS
sample is 2006 and the policy was implemented in 2001. Controlling for race, education, and
individual fixed effects, as well as full interactions between race and education with age, the
difference-in-differences estimate of recently diagnosed diabetes is 2.6 percentage points
(column one of Table 4). Because of the lag, the estimate is not directly comparable to the 2.7
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percentage point increase in diagnosed diabetes over the same time period; however, the estimate
does suggest that much of this rise in diagnosed diabetes is a result of recent diagnoses.
If veterans are more likely to report being diabetic without being formerly diagnosed
(false-positives), then the detection effects of disability insurance may be overstated. To address
this concern, I estimate the probability of treatment for diabetes, defined as taking insulin or
diabetes pills, which is arguably less likely to be influenced by false-positive responses than
diagnosis singly. The results, in column 2 of Table 4, indicate a differential rise in diabetes
treatment, though the estimated growth is somewhat smaller than the increase in diagnosed
diabetes (2.4 percentage points compared to 2.7 percentage points). 12 I also estimate the
probability of having been diagnosed with hypertension, a condition associated with diabetes but
not with AT38. The estimate, presented in column 3 of Table 4, indicates that the prevalence of
diagnosed hypertensives increased by 3.4 percentage points, but the coefficient is only
statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. Agent Orange is also associated
with the onset of certain cancers, though compensation for some types of cancer was deemed
presumptively service-connected before AT38 was implemented; so false-positive responses for
cancer may the affect prevalence estimates of cancer, but the rate should not change
differentially when AT38 was implemented. Thus, as a specification check, I estimate a
differential change in the prevalence of cancer among veterans and find no effect (column 4 of
Table 4). Taken together, the results suggest that the observed rise in diabetes reflects the
detection of undiagnosed diabetes and not false-positive survey responses.

12

Treatment for diabetes increased by 4.2 percentage point among veterans without a college

degree (not shown), which is quantitatively identical to the rise in self-reported diabetes.
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I then turn to outcomes that are associated with diabetes diagnosis but do not necessarily
require a diagnosis; self-reported health status, overweight, and obesity. As shown in column 4
of Table 4, there appears to be no change in the probability of reporting fair or poor health after
the policy was implemented. There is also little to no change in the rates of overweight and
obesity: the rates increased by 1.6 and .9 percentage points, respectively, compared to the
average rates of 74.2 and 29.1 among the entire sample.
The estimates of body mass index have two implications. First, disability insurance
theoretically induces moral hazard behavior, so Vietnam veterans may be less likely to abstain
from behaviors that lead to diabetes. Since diet and exercise are two of the three known causes
of diabetes – diet, exercise, and family background - changes in body mass index arguably serves
as a proxy for changes in health behavior. Thus, the negligible change in overweight and obesity
suggests moral hazard is not a major factor in this context. And second, to the extent that
individuals understand the causal link between weight and diabetes, individuals may not
necessarily know their diabetes status even if they are high risk for diabetes onset.
Finally, I consider differential changes in insurance status among Vietnam veterans.
Generally all veterans, regardless of military service era or disability status, may enroll in the
Veterans Health Administration healthcare system, but enrolled veterans are categorized into one
of eight priority groups to ensure that VHA funds are directed to those who need care the most.
Assignment to priority groups is partly a function of income and service-connected disabilities.
A veteran with no prior service-connected disability who is recently awarded DC benefits could
move from priority group seven or eight (depending on income) to group one, two or three
(depending on the severity of diabetes).

21

The link between VA health insurance and service-connected disability status implies
that AT38 may affect whether a veteran is insured and the type of insurance coverage. I present
linear probability estimates of insurance through the VA and one’s employer in columns 8 and 9
of Table 4, respectively. As indicated, the rate of insurance through the VA increased by 4.7
percentage points among veterans. But the interpretation of this coefficient is not
straightforward since non veterans, who are not eligible for VA health coverage, do not serve as
an adequate comparison group. Nonetheless, the increase in VA health coverage corresponds
with a 3.0 percentage point decline in coverage through one’s employer. One interpretation is
that expanded healthcare coverage through the VA program crowds out private health insurance
coverage, which is consistent with previous findings of the crowd out effects of social insurance
(Cutler and Gruber, 1996). Better identification of AT38’s effect on VA healthcare coverage,
and the extent to which it crowds out private health insurance, is an important next step.
V. Policy Implications
The results presented here suggest that monetary incentives encourage the detection of
latent medical conditions. In fact, based on simplifying assumptions, 40% of undiagnosed
diabetes cases among Vietnam Era veterans – 80% of undiagnosed cases among Vietnam
veterans – were detected as a result of AT38.13 If identifying conditions among undiagnosed
13

The estimate is based on two calculations. First, to estimate the prevalence of diagnosed

diabetes among Vietnam Era veteran in the absence of the policy, I assume that the prevalence
rates would have been similar among Vietnam veterans and other Vietnam Era veterans in 2006
in the absence of the policy. The rate of diagnosed diabetes in 2006 was 16.0 percent (Appendix
Table 1), so if 2.7 percent of these cases are newly diagnosed (5.4 percent among Vietnam
veterans only), the prevalence would have been 13.3 percent (16.0-.5*5.4) in the absence of
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populations is a prescribed policy goal, then the apparent response of veterans to AT38 has a
direct policy implication: provide monetary incentives to encourage medical screening. The
efficiency of such a policy, of course, depends whether the benefits of early detection outweigh
the costs of the financial incentive.
One benefit of detecting and treating diabetes early is the value of additional time lived.
According to Bunker, Frazier and Mosteller (1994), the detection and treatment of diabetes
increases life expectancy, on average, by six months. The value of this additional time lived can
be calculated from previous estimates of the statistical value life. Derived from a hedonic wage
model, Kniesner and Viscusi (2005) estimate that the average value of statistical life is
approximately $4.7 million.14 This value, of course, represents all future benefits of life over the
expected years remaining. The expected additional years remaining for veterans affected by
AT38 is 12 years: the average age of veterans in this sample is 53 and, according Curtin and
Strong (1988), the average life expectancy of an adult-onset diabetic is approximately 65 years

AT38. Second, assuming one-third of diabetes cases would have been undiagnosed in the
absence of the policy – the average rate in the US - the prevalence of diagnosed and undiagnosed
diabetes is 20.0 percent in 2006. Thus, 40.0 percent (2.7/(20.0-13.3)) of undiagnosed diabetes
cases had been detected as a result of AT38.
14

The value of statistical life may need to be adjust downward as one ages since there are less

years lived; however, Kniesner, Viscusi and Ziliak (2005) suggest that the value of statistical
life should not be adjusted, and may even need to be adjust upward, because consumption over
the life-course may be back loaded. I do not make such an adjustment.
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of age.15 Assuming the current value of statistical life is equal across all expected years of life
remaining, the current value of life among is $429,000 per year.16 Thus, the present discounted
value of the additional six months of life, among those who detected their diabetes early due to
AT38, is $142,000 on average ($215,000 discounted 13 periods at a rate of 3 percent). The value
of increased life expectancy is interpreted as a social gain in welfare since the benefit of early
detection would have been forgone otherwise.
To determine total welfare benefits from early detection, the value of additional time
lived is factored by the number of newly diagnosed diabetics. To determine the number of new
diagnoses, I factor the estimated effect of the AT38 on the prevalence of diabetes among
Vietnam veterans (5.4 percent) and the estimated 3 million Vietnam veterans in 2006. Thus,
approximately 160,000 diabetes cases were newly diagnosed.17 The welfare gain per newly
diagnosed diabetic is $142,000, so the total welfare gain due to increased life expectancy among
new DC beneficiaries is approximately $22.7 billion.
The increase in DC expenditures is undoubtedly the largest cost component of AT38.
According to Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2008), AT38 increased the average DC benefit
15

The assumption that undiagnosed diabetics expect to live to 65 is most applicable to cases

where diabetes is certain though the individual chooses not to be diagnosed or treated.
16

The present value of a nominal annuity of $429,000, discounted at a rate of 3 percent, is equal

to $4.7 million in present value.
17

According to tabulations from Census 2000 by the VA, there were 6 million veterans who

served in Vietnam who did not serve in Korea, WWII, or after August 1990 (retrieved in
February 2008 at http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/page.cfm?pg=1). Based on the CPS Veteran
Supplement, approximately half of Vietnam Era veterans served in or around Vietnam.
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by $11,000 per year among those affected by the policy, and total DC expenditures by $50
billion in net present value. However, their DC expenditure estimate is based on the total
number veterans affected by AT38 - estimated to be 263,000 - not the total of veterans affected
due to diabetes specifically – which is approximately 144,000.18 Assuming the 144,000
beneficiaries receive $11,000 over the course of 13 years, the increase in DC benefits among
diabetics is approximately $17.4 billion (approximately $120,000 per diabetic beneficiary).
Thus, the total increase in DC expenditures well exceeds the gains from the increased life
expectancy among diabetics, but the gains in life expectancy exceed the expenditure costs
attributable to diabetics by $5.3 billion. There are, however, important components of this
simplified calculation that are omitted. First, the benefits may be understated because early
detection may delay the onset of debilitating conditions associated with diabetes. To my
knowledge, there is no precise measure of the effect of early diabetes detection on the reduction
in morbidity or the value of reducing morbidity itself, so it is difficult to include this factor in the
welfare calculation. Regardless, veterans are no less likely to report being in fair or poor health;
so the welfare gains due to improved well-being, if any, have yet to be realized. And second, the
costs do not reflect the continued expansion of DC rolls and expenditures in the years to come.
To be sure, the discrete change in DC roll growth as a result of the policy persists well after the
year in which it was implemented. And finally, costs may be understated or overstated
depending on whether the costs of early detection and treatment are greater or less than the
subsequent costs if the condition remained undiagnosed.
The results do, however, suggest that the net gain among newly diagnosed diabetics is
positive: $142,000 versus $120,000. Therefore, if monetary incentives are considered to
18

According to VBA Reports, there were 43,395 diabetes cases compensated at the end of fiscal
year 2001, and 190,199 diabetes cases compensated at the end of fiscal year 2005.
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encourage the detection of latent medical conditions among the undiagnosed population, it may
be more efficient to target those who are most likely to be afflicted with a medical condition but
are least likely to be diagnosed.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
Economic theory predicts that the availability of disability insurance may encourage
health disinvestment by inducing moral hazard behavior. The null hypothesis of moral hazard
effects, therefore, is that the prevalence of the insured disability does not increase once disability
benefits become available. However, if benefits encourage the detection of latent conditions,
which also predicts a rise in the prevalence of the insured disability, then the empirical test of
detection effects and moral hazard effects are indistinguishable.
This study provides suggestive evidence that disability insurance does increase the
incidence of diagnosis. More specifically, the advent of DC benefits to Vietnam veterans for
diabetes increased the prevalence of diagnosed diabetes among the Vietnam veteran population
by 5.4 percentage points, which appears to be driven by newly diagnosed conditions and not
false-positive responses. There is little evidence to suggest that rates of overweight and obesity
increased after AT38 was implemented, casting doubt on the degree to which social disability
insurance induces moral hazard behavior in this context.
The analysis also contributes to the discussion of the causal pathways responsible for the
socioeconomic status and health gradient. First, if patient individuals are more likely to invest in
health and education, as the argument goes, then we may expect a greater impact of AT38 on the
prevalence of diabetes among the less educated. This hypothesis is supported in the data – the
rate of diabetes increased considerably more among the less educated – though it is difficult to
disentangle this effect from the fact that Vietnam Era veterans without a college degree are
slightly more likely to have served in Vietnam. And second, free diabetes screenings have been
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available to Vietnam through the Agent Orange registry since 1978, yet some diabetic veterans
chose not to be diagnosed. Thus, in the context of this study, it is difficult to argue that
differential access to medical screening plays a large role in the rate of undiagnosed diabetes
across socioeconomic strata. Developing a broader understanding of factors that affect the
detection and treatment decision, and how this decision contributes to the socioeconomic and
health gradient, is an important area of future research.

Appendix Table 1: Prevalence of Diabetes and Diabetes Treatment
A. Veterans
Year
1997‐1998
1999‐2000
2001‐2002
2003‐2004
2005‐2006

B. Nonveterans

Diabetes
7.30
(0.75)
8.52
(0.82)
10.60
(0.92)
16.37
(1.59)
18.05

Treatment
5.34
(0.65)
5.61
(0.68)
8.11
(0.82)
13.06
(1.44)
13.96

Diabetes
7.62
(0.58)
9.60
(0.68)
11.95
(0.74)
13.55
(1.18)
14.64

Treatment
5.48
(0.50)
8.05
(0.63)
9.76
(0.68)
11.73
(1.11)
12.18

(1.21)

(1.09)

(0.92)

(0.85)

Estimates are derived from NHIS data in 1997 through 2006. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Sample weights were used.
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Table 1: Initial Monthly Benefit and Change after AT38 by Diabetes Mellitus Rating
A. Change in Monthly Benefit by Diabetes Mellitus Rating
Initial Rating
Initial Benefit ($)

0%
0

10%
103

20%
199

30%
306

40%
439

50%
625

60%
790

70% 80% 90% 100%
995 1155 1299 2163

Diabetes Rating
10%
20%
30%
60%
100%

103
199
306
790
2163

96
203
336
687
2060

107
240
240
796
1964

133
133
319
689
1857

186
186
351
716
1724

165
165
165
530
1538

0
0
0
205 160
0
205 160 144
365 304 144
1373 1168 1008

0
0
0
864
864

0
0
0
0
0

B. Description of Diabetes Mellitus Severity: VBA Schedule for Rating Disabilities
10%: Manageable by restricted diet only
20%: Rating of 10% and requiring insulin or hypoglycemic agent
40%: Requiring restricted diet, insulin, and regulation of activities
60%: Activities with episodes of ketoacidosis or hypoglycemic reactions requiring one or two hospitalizations per year
or twice a month visits to a diabetic care provider, plus complications that would not be compensable if separately
evaluated
100%: Requiring more than one daily injection of insulin, diet, and regulation of activities (avoidance of strenuous
occupational and recreation activities) with episodes of ketoacidosis or hypoglycemic reactions requiring at least
three hospitalizations per year or weekly visits to a diabetic care provider, plus either progressive loss of weight and
strength or complications that would be compensable if separately evaluated
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Table 2: Demographic Characteristics by Veteran Status: NHIS males, 1997 ‐ 2006
Veteran Status
Observations
Age
Married

Race (%)
White
Black
Other
Education (%)
Less Than High School
High School
Some College
College and Beyond
Insurance Status (%)
Private
VA
None

Veterans
5033

Non‐Veterans
8190

53.8
(0.05)
74.6
(0.61)

53.3
(0.04)
74.6
(0.48)

89.1
(0.44)
8.0
(0.38)
3.0
(0.24)

82.1
(0.42)
9.7
(0.330
8.2
(0.30)

6.5
(0.35)
30.3
(0.65)
35.5
(0.67)
27.7
(0.63)

17.9
(0.42)
24.5
(0.48)
22.0
(0.46)
35.6
(0.53)

80.4
(0.56)
12.7
(0.47)
7.4
(0.37)

80.0
(0.44)
0.4
(0.07)
12.2
(0.36)

Estimates are derived from pooled NHIS data in 1997 through 2006. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Sample weights were used.
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Table 3: Linear Probability Estimates of Diabetes Diagnosis by Educational Attainment: NHIS males, 1997‐2006
Education
(1)
Vet*Post
Vet
Black
Other
High School
Some College
College and Beyond

2.91
(1.27)*
‐1.58
(0.68)*

A. All
(2)

(3)

2.93
(1.26)*
‐1.25
(0.70)
5.58
(1.15)*
4.79
(1.39)*
‐2.61
(1.10)*
‐2.85
(1.12)*
‐7.03
(1.02)*

2.73
(1.25)*
‐1.11
(0.70)
‐1.93
(2.71)
10.20
(10.45)
6.24
(4.82)
0.38
(1.17)
3.28
(3.04)

B. No College Degree
(1)
(2)
(3)
4.04
(1.62)*
‐2.41
(0.85)*

4.12
(1.62)*
‐1.59
(0.87)
4.16
(1.28)*
3.46
(1.72)*

4.20
(1.62)*
‐1.57
(0.87)
‐2.74
(2.75)
‐1.31
(0.96)

‐2.77
(1.11)*
‐2.95
(1.12)*

5.02
(4.56)
0.00
(0.57)

N
13233
13233
13233
9135
9135
9135
R‐Squared
0.0158
0.0271
0.0382 0.0228
0.0263
0.0404
Linear probability estimates are derived from NHIS data in years 1997 through 2006. The Post indicator is equal
to one in years 2001 through 2006 and zero otherwise. The left‐out groups for race and education are white and
no high school diploma, respectively. Period effects, in two year increments, and individual age fixed effects are
included, but the estimates are not presented for brevity. Estimates are factored by 100 and are interpreted as
percentage point changes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5 percent
level of confidence.
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Table 4: Linear Probability Estimates of Auxilliary Outcome Variables: NHIS males, 1997‐2006
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Recently
Hyper‐
VA
Private
Outcome
Diagnosed Treatment tension Cancer Overweight Fair/Poor Obese Insurance Insurance
Variable Mean
4.9
9.0
34.9
6.3
74.2
14.4
29.1
5.2
80.1
Vet*Post
Vet
Black
Other
High School
Some College
College and Beyond

2.56
(0.91)*
‐0.91
(0.48)
‐2.66
(2.59)
‐1.10
(0.66)
4.90
(4.60)
‐0.14
(0.48)
0.21
(0.98)

2.36
(1.17)*
‐1.49
(0.64)*
‐1.86
(2.71)
10.49
(10.49)
6.36
(4.82)
0.49
(1.21)
2.50
(2.95)

3.37
(1.90)
1.25
(1.21)
3.70
(10.94)
‐4.17
(9.39)
‐13.13
(14.26)
‐25.23
(12.78)*
‐11.51
(14.08)

0.00
(1.03)
0.78
(0.62)
‐1.13
(0.78)
‐4.13
(2.84)
‐0.69
(0.48)
0.72
(1.21)
7.27
(4.98)

1.59
(1.67)
1.14
(1.14)
‐5.55
(10.97)
‐20.33
(13.45)
‐2.56
(13.86)
11.74
(12.30)
‐10.96
(13.91)

‐0.44
(1.31)
‐0.62
(0.78)
‐5.52
(5.49)
28.44
(14.45)*
‐13.28
(12.78)
‐15.96
(12.21)
‐22.01
(12.05)

0.87
4.66
(1.85) (1.16)*
1.39
10.33
(1.19) (0.68)*
3.19
3.13
(10.54) (6.40)
‐5.15
‐0.77
(9.66) (2.33)
5.52
‐13.19
(10.66) (8.51)
‐3.38 ‐11.18
(9.27) (8.69)
10.75 ‐12.12
(11.80) (7.66)

‐2.96
(1.48)*
‐1.31
(0.92)
‐10.28
(11.03)
‐7.36
(9.12)
31.22
(14.28)*
39.67
(13.54)*
38.87
(13.35)*

N
13223
13220
13198 13209
13223
13208 13223 13223
13223
R‐Squared
0.020
0.038
0.048 0.019
0.025
0.090 0.024
0.097
0.114
Linear probability estimates are derived from NHIS data in years 1997 through 2006. The Post indicator is equal to one in
years 2001 through 2006 and zero otherwise. The left‐out groups for race and education are white and no high school
diploma, respectively. Period effects, in two year increments, and individual age fixed effects are included, but the
estimates are not presented for brevity. Estimates are factored by 100 and thereare are interpreted as percentage point
changes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5 percent level of confidence.
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